By Justice Oludotun Adefope-Okojie,JCA(Rtd)
Adefope-Okojie presenting an award to Olisa Agbakoba,SAN
The credibility of an electoral system depends not only on the conduct of elections but also on the
existence of effective mechanisms for resolving
disputes arising before, during, and after elections.
The ideal situation should be that the vote of the people should be decided at the polling unit, rather than the court of law. The contrary is however the prevalent situation in this country.
The Political parties have done immeasurable harm to the polity. They seem incapable of abiding by their own Party’s Constitution in their selection of the rightful candidates to be fielded in the election, which, contrarily, in a number of instances has boomeranged against them, with the rightfully elected but rejected candidate working for the opposing side in the actual election, out of spite. The parties have also taken advantage of the Courts’ position of not intervening in the domestic affairs of the party, to commit all manner of atrocities.
It is the flawed congresses and wrongful substitution of successful candidates by imposition of handpicked ones, and an electoral system challenged by honesty, that led to most of the litigations in the past elections.
At the actual election were accusations of ballot snatching, vote rigging, vote buying, manipulations and outright falsification of results. The resultant effect is the recourse to the Courts for determination of the rightful candidate, a duty which should have been resolved at the polling booth and the rightful declaration by INEC. The unfortunate result is that a number of the people in the Legislature, not only at Federal but at State and Local Government levels are not the desire of the electorate.
They, in consequence, owe the electorate no duty to represent them. This is an aberration!
First, this country litigates its elections on a scale without parallel among comparable democracies.
The 1,209 petitions that followed the 2023 general elections were filed against 1,280 contested offices: roughly 94 petitions for every 100 seats. Kenya’s comparable figure fell from about 21 petitions per 100 elective seats in 2017 to under 7 in 2022. Ghana’s 2020 parliamentary elections produced about 6.
The United Kingdom has averaged about four petitions a year across all its elections since 1977, most of them local. South Africa resolved 579 objections at the level of its Electoral Commission in 2024 and saw a single court challenge to the national result, later withdrawn. These figures do not measure the quality of justice. They measure trust, and on that measure the Nigerian electoral process is in severe deficit.
Secondly, volume has not produced vindication. Only 103 of the 1,209 petitions of 2023 succeeded; the rest were withdrawn, struck out, dismissed or refused. A system in which more than nine in ten petitions fail is not one in which the courts are correcting widespread error.
A table of the state of Nigerian electoral litigation compared with some African countries, is set out below:5
Jurisdiction and election
Petitions filed
Seats contested
Petitions per 100 seats
Nigeria, 20236
1,209
1,280
94.5
Zambia, 20217
About 83 (parliamentary)
156
53.2
Malawi, 20198
44 (parliamentary), plus a presidential petition
193
22.8
Kenya, 20179 388
1,882
20.6
Kenya, 202210
123 on elective seats (219 matters including party-list disputes)
1,882
6.5
Ghana, 202011
16 (parliamentary), plus a presidential petition
275
5.8
Nigeria’s ratio is inflated in part because several petitions are often filed against the same seat.
Even allowing for that, it is almost double the next highest and about sixteen times Ghana’s.
Electoral Process: Petition reduces when elections improve-Justice Adefope-Okojie
OGUN 2027: PDP may not win a single ward,APC replies 18 LGA boast
Outside Africa the contrast is sharper. In the United Kingdom, 302 election petitions were lodged across parliamentary, European and local elections between 1900 and 2016, fewer than three a year, and most recent petitions concern local rather than parliamentary results.12
The last parliamentary election voided by an election court was Oldham East and Saddleworth in 2010.13 South Africa routes disputes first to its Electoral Commission. After the 2024 national elections, the Commission received 579 objections and ordered recounts in 24 instances, while the only court challenge to the national result was withdrawn.14 The United States records a large volume of election litigation, 756 cases in the 2023–2024 cycle by one count, but most of it concerns the rules of voting before polling day rather than challenges to declared results.15
Two lessons follow. First, the volume of petitions responds to trust: Kenya’s petitions on elective seats fell from 388 after the annulled 2017 presidential election to 123 in 2022. Second, jurisdictions that filter disputes before they reach the courts, through a credible electoral commission empowered to resolve objections or through strict rules on time and costs, see far fewer cases. Nigeria has no equivalent filter: almost every grievance, save for a cosmetic grievance resolution procedure at the party level, goes straight to the tribunal.
The simplistic answer to the avoidance or reduction of Judicial intervention in electoral matters is for the parties to comply with the tenets of justice and to observe their various party constitutions in their selection of candidates. It is also for the electoral body to abide by its mandate in its impartial conduct of the elections.
Seat totals follow each country’s constitutional allocation of elective seats: Nigeria, 1,280 contested offices; Zambia, 156 constituencies; Malawi, 193 constituencies; Kenya, 1,882 elective seats (the presidency, 47 governors, 47 senators, 47 woman representatives, 290 members of the National Assembly and 1,450 members of county assemblies); Ghana, 275 constituencies. The ratios are the author’s calculation.
‘INEC’s Credibility Sinks as 94% Contested Posts Await Tribunal’ (n 1); ‘Appeal Court Treats 1,209 Petitions From 2023 Elections’ (n 1).
‘Zambia Should Establish Election Tribunals’ (Daily Nation, 3 September 2021) <https://www.pressreader.com/zambia/daily-nation-newspaper/20210903/281543704031096> accessed 20 October 2026.
‘3 More MPs’ Victories Nullified’ (The Nation, 2020) <https://mwnation.com/3-more-mps-victories-nullified/> accessed 20 October 2026.
‘Judicial Report Indicates Courts Determined Cases by July 27 to Beat September Deadline’ (n 2).
Judiciary of Kenya, ‘CJ Koome Receives Report on Status of Election Petitions Arising from the 2022 General Election’ (Judiciary of Kenya, 30 January 2023) <https://judiciary.go.ke/cj-koome-receives-report-on-status-of-election-peti-tions-arising-from-the-2022-general-election/> accessed 20 October 2026; ‘CJ Koome Gazettes 123 Election Disputes to Be Heard’ (n 2).
‘Review of Judiciary in 2021’ (n 2).
Wilks-Heeg and Morris (n 2)..
Watkins v Woolas [2010] EWHC 2702 (QB).
‘IEC Confirms It Has Ordered Rec ounts in 24 Instances’ (n 3); ‘MK Party Withdraws Electoral Court Challenge Disputing Election Results’ (n 3).
Rick Hasen, ‘Election Litigation Hits Record, Increasing More than 14 Percent in the 2024 Election Cycle Compared to the 2020 Election Cycle Despite End of COVID Pandemic’ (Election Law Blog, 24 March 2025) <https://electionlawblog.
org/2025/election-litigation-hits-record-increasing-more-than-14-percent-in-the-2024-election-cycle-compared-to-the-2020-election-cycle-despite-end-of-covid-pandemic/> accessed 20 October 2026.
It is also incumbent on the Courts to change their posture in their refusal to intervene in intra-party affairs but to come down heavily in deserving cases, in order to stop the manipulations going on in the parties, with their unlawful and unjust substitution of deserving candidates by the imposition of undeserving and unelected ones. This, the Supreme Court did in the recent unreported case between PDP v Alhaji Sule Lamido in Appeal No. SC/CV/164/2026 delivered on the 30th day of April 2026 on the issue of justiciability of internal or domestic affairs of a party. The Court, in their majority judgment of 3-2, delivered by His Lordship Stephen Jonah Adah JSC, (Tsammani and Abubakar Sadiq Umar JJSC dissenting), while reiterating their position that internal affairs of a party are not justiciable, held that where a political party violates its own constitution and “rubbishes” the Electoral Act and the Constitution, the Court must intervene (Emphasis Mine).
I agree with the majority decision of their Lordships. The Courts must no longer refuse to intervene where political parties violate their own constitution and “rubbish” the Electoral Act, as stated in the case above, they must intervene to sanitise the system. The duty of the Courts is to ensure that justice is done and not to shut its eyes against its bastardisation by the political parties.
Judicial intervention in electoral disputes is therefore indispensable to the preservation of constitutional government, the enforcement of electoral laws, and the protection of citizens’ political rights.
Through their functions of determining whether candidates satisfy constitutional requirements, elections comply with applicable laws, and persons declared winners were validly elected, the judiciary serves as an institutional safeguard against electoral illegality and arbitrariness.
A central question for this topic is: How can Nigerian courts protect electoral integrity and enforce compliance with electoral laws without exceeding their constitutionally defined role or undermining the democratic choices of voters?
This paper examines the boundaries of judicial intervention in Nigeria’s electoral process and the relationship between that intervention and the constitutional right of Nigerians to choose their representatives through the ballot. Drawing on the 1999 Constitution, the Electoral Act 2026, the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal from 1983 to 2026, and the experience of other African jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and the United States, it argues that judicial intervention is legitimate to the extent that it protects the voters’ choice, and loses legitimacy when it replaces that choice. It identifies two recurring failures, substitution and abdication, and proposes principles and a programme of reform for managing the boundary ahead of the 2027 general elections.
1. Introduction: The Court and the Ballot Box
Nigeria’s democracy rests on two promises that can pull against each other. The first is that the people choose their rulers. The second is that every election is governed by law and every grievance can be taken to a court. When the courts enforce the law faithfully, the two promises reinforce each other. When courts are drawn into deciding who governs on grounds remote from the vote, the second promise begins to consume the first.
Since 1999, and especially since 2007, Nigerian courts have become a second electoral arena. Candidates now plan for the tribunal as carefully as for the campaign.
The phrase “go to court” has become an accepted response to defeat, and a rising number of office-holders, as stated above, owe their seats to judgments rather than to ballots. The Judiciary did not seek this role; the Constitution, the Electoral Act and the weaknesses of electoral administration thrust it upon the courts.
The 2023 General Elections, as well as subsequent off-cycle elections, have generated important questions about the adjudication of election petitions and the independence and institutional capacity of the Judiciary.
This has brought the Judiciary increasingly to the centre of Nigeria’s democratic process. It has made the Judiciary, very unfortunately, the “awarder” of political posts to the candidates, rather than the victor emerging from the votes cast by the electorate.
The question for the Bench is therefore not whether courts should intervene. The Constitution commands them to. The question is how to intervene in a way that strengthens, rather than displaces the sovereign choice of the electorate. That is what “managing the boundaries” means.
Three features make the question urgent in November 2026:
A new legal framework. The Electoral Act 2026, signed into law on 18 February 2026, repealed the 2022 Act and changed the grounds for petitions, the status of electronic results and the pre-election timetable.
An early election. Presidential and National Assembly elections hold on 16 January 2027, governorship and state assembly elections on 6 February 2027, with the aim of conclusion of all pre and post-election litigation before the date scheduled for swearing in. Pre-election litigation is already at its peak.
A trust deficit. It is not in dispute that there is a trust deficit in the ability of the Courts to render unbiased decisions on electoral litigation. The Chief Justice of Nigeria only just recently, at the 2026 roundtable for heads of courts organised by the National Judicial Institute and also at the Special Supreme Court Session in Abuja marking the official opening of the 2026/2027 Legal Year and the swearing in of 68 new SANs, cautioned Judges against practices that could undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as the country prepares for the 2027 general elections. She urged the Judiciary to discharge its constitutional responsibilities with impartiality, courage and fidelity to the law and that the integrity of judicial proceedings must not be compromised by competing political interests or pressure from any quarter.19 •She has also warned that judges on election tribunals will be closely watched.
2. The Constitutional Right to Choose Representatives
The right of Nigerians to choose their representatives is a composite right. No single section of the 1999 Constitution states it in one sentence, but it emerges clearly from the structure of the Constitution and from treaties binding on Nigeria.
2.1 Domestic sources
Provision
What it secures
Relevance to judicial intervention
s.14(1) and (2)(a)
Nigeria is founded on democracy and social justice; sovereignty belongs to the people, from whom government derives all its powers
The interpretive anchor: courts exercise delegated sovereign power and must read electoral law to give
effect to the people’s will
s.14(2)(c)
Participation by the people in their government shall be ensured
Though in Chapter II (nonjusticiable under s.6(6)(c)), it guides interpretation of justiciable provisions
ss.77(2), 117(2)
Every registered citizen of 18 years and above is entitled to vote in National
Assembly and State Assembly elections
The closest textual expression of an individual right to vote
ss.132, 133-134, 178-179
Presidential and governorship elections; winning thresholds, including spread requirements
Courts interpret the thresholds and so determine what counts as the people’s choice
s.40
Freedom of association, including to form or belong to a political party
Protects party choice; underpins the doctrine that parties control their internal affairs
s.39
Freedom of expression
Protects campaigning and political speech
s.42
Freedom from discrimination
Equal value of each vote across groups and places
ss.65-66, 106-107, 131, 137, 177, 182
Qualifications and disqualifications for elective office
Define who voters may lawfully choose; the main source of preelection litigation
ss.221-229
Only registered parties may canvass for votes or sponsor candidates
The basis of the rule in Amaechi that votes belong to the party
s.153 and Third Schedule, Part I, para 15
INEC organises and supervises elections
Courts review INEC but do not run elections
s.6(6)(b)
Judicial power extends to determining civil rights and obligations
The general source of judicial power over electoral disputes
ss.239, 246(3), 233(2)(e),
285
Election courts, tribunals, appellate finality and time limits
The special jurisdiction that both empowers and limits courts
2.2 International and regional sources
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3): the will of the people is the basis of the authority of government, expressed in periodic and genuine elections.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 25 (Nigeria acceded in 1993): every citizen has the right and opportunity, without unreasonable restrictions, to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 25 adds that the results of genuine elections should be respected and implemented, and that there should be independent scrutiny of the counting process with access to judicial review.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 13: every citizen has the right to participate freely in government, directly or through freely chosen representatives. The Charter is part of Nigerian law through the African Charter (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap A9, LFN 2004, and was held enforceable in Nigerian courts in Abacha v Fawehinmi.
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007): binds states to hold regular, transparent, free and fair elections and to establish impartial mechanisms for resolving electoral disputes in a timely manner.
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), art. 1: accession to power must be through free, fair and transparent elections.
Thus, not only by our Constitution but also by International and Regional Statutes subscribed to by this Country are Courts bound to exercise delegated sovereign power but they must read electoral law to give effect to the people’s will.
2.3 What the right contains
Read together, these sources give the right to choose representatives at least five components, each of which a court can either protect or erode:
1 Access: to register and to vote without unreasonable restriction.
Choice: to choose among lawfully nominated candidates and parties.
Equality: each lawful vote counts equally and is counted.
Effectiveness: the declared result reflects the votes cast, and the person chosen takes office.
Remedy: an independent, timely forum to correct a result that does not reflect the vote.
The fifth component is the constitutional justification for judicial intervention. It, however, exists for the sake of the first four. A remedy that defeats access, choice, equality or effectiveness is a remedy against the right it was meant to secure.
2.4 Whose right is it: party, candidate or voter?
Nigerian law has historically treated election disputes as contests between candidates and parties. Section 137 of the Electoral Act 2026, like section 133 of the 2022 Act before it, limits petitioners to candidates and parties. Voters, whose sovereignty is at stake, have no standing to petition. Failure to appreciate this fact has led to a number of decisions of the Courts to the relegation of the wish of the electorate with the declaration of persons who, more often than not, are not the actual winners of the elections!
Critics argue that this gap allowed the Supreme Court in the Zamfara case (APC v Marafa) to declare a super-majority of votes “wasted” without hearing or taking into consideration the affected voters. The Supreme Court held that the APC had held no valid primaries in Zamfara, so it had no candidates and all votes cast for it were wasted. Candidates with the next highest votes and the required spread were declared elected. The PDP took the governorship and every National and State Assembly seat in the state, though the APC had won the overwhelming majority of votes.
A few other very painful instances are:
PDP v Degi-Eremienyo (Bayelsa): a day before inauguration, the Court disqualified the APC deputy-governorship candidate for submitting false information. As the ticket was joint, the winning governor-elect fell with him, and the runner-up was sworn in.
Plateau (2023-2024): the Court of Appeal removed the Governor and several National and State Assembly members of the PDP on the ground that the party lacked valid structures. The Supreme Court restored the Governor in January 2024, holding that sponsorship was a pre-election matter. Unfortunately, the legislators had no appeal beyond the Court of Appeal (s.246(3) of the Constitution) so the seats were lost on a ground the Supreme Court later held to be outside the tribunals’ jurisdiction. This remains the starkest illustration of how finality rules can lock in an erroneous intervention. Unfortunately, the losing party’s candidates who were not the choice of the electorate, were sworn in, in place of the successful candidates at the polls.
The boundaries of intervention must take seriously that the absent party in every election case is the electorate.
3. Technicalities versus Substance
Many petitions fail on pleadings, front-loading of witness statements, dumping of documents without linking them to specific polling units, or the 180-day limit. The Edo Tribunal, for example, in the Governorship dispute between Asue Ighodalo of the PDP and Monday Okpebholo of the APC, dismissed the Petition of Asue Ighodalo on the ground, inter alia, that much of the Petitioners’ testimony was hearsay, the polling unit agents to testify of electoral irregularities and other electoral officers, were not called, in spite of documentary evidence in proof. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals against the Tribunal’s Judgment.
While I agree that strict rules are necessary in a time-limited jurisdiction, where they become the main reason petitions fail, the public reads them as a device for avoiding the merits. The boundary is crossed in either direction by courts that overlook defects to reach a preferred outcome, and by courts that use defects to avoid a case that deserves an answer.
4. The Evidential Burden and Technology
A Petitioner, by case law, as in the case of Ighodalo above, must prove non-compliance polling unit by polling unit and show substantial effect on the result, typically with thousands of documents and witnesses within weeks. With up to 176,000 polling units nationally, the burden is often practically impossible. The Courts in their judgments have made it almost impossible to prove election petitions.
In so doing, the Evidence Act, in my opinion, has been relegated in favour of the introduction of a new and onerous burden of proof not required or contemplated by the Evidence Act. The fact that election petitions are said to be sui generis, in my very humble opinion, does not justify the abandonment of the express stipulations in the Evidence Act or Electoral Act guiding proof of facts, the Courts preferring instead to build a body of law outside these laws. An example is the Court’s divergence from the explicit provisions in the Evidence Act for proof of documents.
Sections 102 to 105 of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended in 2023) on proof of public documents,32 which includes documents of official bodies, stipulates that certified copies are admissible in proof of the contents of these documents, without the need to call the certifying officer. However, by evolving jurisprudence in our courts on electoral cases, these provisions of the Evidence Act are being relegated in favour of onerous interpretations which negate these sections. The Courts, for instance, reject electoral documents, duly certified and properly proved, preferring instead that the Commission’s witnesses personally attend to testify, including witnesses from each polling booth in the Constituency, State or entire country, irrespective of whether the documents sought to be tendered have been properly proved by cogent evidence or not!
This, I believe, is placing an onerous burden on the Petitioner, and in my humble opinion, is contrary to the express stipulations in the Evidence Act, which Act is the substratum of our law in proof of any fact.
Failure to call the maker of the document or the official of the Electoral body, should only go to the weight to be attached to the document, if the document is found to lack probative value, and should not result in its outright rejection. It is these onerous provisions, uncontemplated by the Evidence Act or indeed the Electoral Act, that have made it practically impossible to ever prove irregularities in an election. The unfortunate result is that an election, no matter how fraudulent, cannot be voided! I do not believe the interpretation of the Evidence Act in this manner serves the interest of justice, which is why the most discredited elections and undeserving candidates are the ones that are returned!!
My wonder is what is so special about election disputes, that takes them out of the remit of the Evidence Act over and above other even more important disputes?
In any event Paragraph 46(4) of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act 2026 (identical to Paragraph 46(4) of the Electoral Act 2022) allows documentary evidence to be put in and which may be taken as read, and deemed to be demonstrated in open Court, with liberty to the parties to address the Court. This negates the requirement, which our courts are demanding, for witnesses from every polling booth or INEC office to have to appear to speak to their documents, in default of which the documents or evidence are regarded as hearsay and inadmissible. I do not believe a case should ever be lost on this fact. The worst the Court/Tribunal can do is to attach minimal weight, if it is found not duly proved, and not reject the document and then proceed to dismiss the Petition.
It is incumbent on our Courts to obey the tenets of these laws in electoral disputes and not give any special interpretation outside their ambit, otherwise the Courts will be seen to be emboldening conniving “Respondents”, who, after manipulating the elections and knowing the impossibility of proof of these malpractices, to glibly direct the dissatisfied party to “Go to Court”. There is a reason for the provision of Paragraph 46(4) of the First Schedule of the Electoral Act 2026 and it should be interpreted in favour of the Petitioner, without the importation of onerous requirements outside both it and the Evidence Act. In any event, the Supreme Court, way back in 2012 has held that the Court will not allow the provisions of an enactment to be read in such a way as to deny access to the Court by a citizen – Fidelity Bank Plc v Monye, per Adekeye JSC.
Granting the electorate a reprieve, thankfully, is the recognition by the 2026 Electoral Act of BVAS and IReV which offers a path to objective, machine-generated evidence.35 The undefined “communication failure” exception may however become a shield that defeats it unless courts develop sensible presumptions.
5. Frontloading of Depositions of Witnesses on Subpoena
Another area of concern to me is the issue of frontloading of witness depositions of subpoenaed witnesses, in particular INEC, a Respondent to the Petition.
There have been divergent decisions on this matter by the Courts, some in favour and others opposed to the necessity for subpoenaed witnesses from INEC to depose to witness statements. The prevalent position now, very sadly, is to double down on this latter position, in favour of frontloading the witness depositions of all witnesses, irrespective of where they are from. The problem, I find, is the expectation that a witness from INEC, who is a Respondent to the Petition and therefore hostile to it, to want to impugn an election it conducted, by deposing to a witness deposition at the behest of the opposing party. This, I note, has led to the dismissal of seemingly meritorious petitions, which, in my opinion, does not serve the interest of justice.
It is my opinion that when facts have been averred in a Petition and documents can be tendered in proof through a witness on subpoena from INEC or any official body, the evidence should be allowed, without the necessity of frontloading the witness statement on oath of the witness.
It is my hope that there will be an amendment to the requirement in Paragraphs 4(5) and 4(6) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2026 which requires that statements on oath of all witnesses must accompany each Petition, by making exceptions in cases of witnesses on subpoena.
6. The Different Types of Justice
The cases fall into four types according to how they relate to the right.
Type
What the court does
Effect on the right to choose
Examples
Corrective
Restores the candidate whom the lawful votes actually favoured, after proof of manipulation
Vindicates the vote
Edo, Ondo, Ekiti, Osun reversals (2008-2010)
Protective of process
Voids a flawed process and returns the decision to voters through a re-run or fresh election
Vindicates the vote, at the cost of delay
Rivers LG elections (2025); re-run orders in specific polling units
Substitutive
Installs or removes an office-holder on grounds voters did not weigh, without returning the question to voters
Displaces the vote
Amaechi (2008), Marafa
(2019), Degi-Eremienyo
(2020); arguably
Uzodinma (2020)
Abdicative
Declines to examine credible evidence of malpractice by reason of technical, evidential or jurisdictional barriers the petitioner could not realistically overcome
Leaves a corrupted declaration in place, so the vote is displaced by the returning officer
The charge levelled by critics against some 2023-2025 decisions
The first two types are what the Constitution requires. The last two are the twin failures. A healthy jurisprudence avoids both these latter ones: it does not substitute, and it does not abdicate.
6.1 Abdicative justice
The 2026 Act gives courts new tools to avoid abdication. Electronically transmitted polling-unit results are now admissible evidence, and frustrating transmission is an offence. Courts can treat a discrepancy between IReV and the collated result as shifting an evidential burden to INEC or the Respondent to explain it, and can require proof of any claimed “communication failure”. These are matters of evidential law within the judiciary’s own competence.
6.2 Substitutive justice
Substitutive judgments usually rest on a sound legal premise applied without regard to its democratic consequence e.g. in the Bayelsa case, which is that a joint ticket stands or falls together, the problem lies in the remedy: the court did not ask what the voters would have done had the defect been known but chose the remedy that gave office to someone voters had rejected.
6.3 A rights-based approach
A rights-based approach, however, asks a different question at the remedy stage: which order most faithfully reflects the will of the electorate, given the defect proved? Where the defect lies in the winner’s candidacy, not in the votes, the answer will often be a fresh election rather than a declaration in favour of the runner-up. The Electoral Act’s provisions on fresh elections, and the court’s general power to make consequential orders, allow this.
7. Principles for Managing the Boundaries
The following principles distil the analysis into a working guide for judges and tribunal members. Each is grounded in existing Nigerian law or in powers courts already have.
Popular sovereignty as the interpretive anchor. Where electoral provisions are ambiguous, prefer the reading that gives effect to the free choice of the electorate (s.14(2)(a); ICCPR art. 25; African Charter art. 13).
Substance over form, within the rules. Apply procedural rules firmly but proportionately. A defect that causes no injustice should not defeat a petition that deserves an answer; a defect should not be overlooked to reach a preferred result.
Integrity, reasons and transparency. Give transparent, full, reasoned judgments that the public can follow and which accords with the justice of the case and avoid any association that suggests political alignment, as the CJN has directed. Legitimacy is the only power the courts have. The polity is aware of judgments that do not accord with the justice of the matter.
The CJN, the PCA and the Heads of Court should not put forward any morally deficient and unknowledgeable Judges as Tribunal members and must screen them for integrity and political neutrality.
8. Comparative Perspectives
Other jurisdictions face the same dilemma and offer usable lessons. Each case below is cited for a principle, not as binding authority.
Jurisdiction and case What the court did Lesson for Nigeria
Kenya: Raila Odinga v IEBC (Supreme Court, 2017)
Annulled a presidential election for illegalities and irregularities in the transmission and verification of results, without requiring proof that the numerical outcome changed;
ordered a fresh election within 60 days.
An election is a process, not only an arithmetic event. Where the process is fundamentally compromised, the remedy is to return the question to voters, not to declare a winner
Malawi: Mutharika v Chilima and Chakwera (2020)
Annulled the 2019 presidential election for widespread irregularities and ordered a fresh poll, which the challenger won
Courts can act decisively against a compromised result while still leaving the final choice to voters
Ghana: Akufo-Addo v Mahama (Supreme Court, 2013)
Upheld the result after an eight-month televised hearing, distinguishing administrative lapses
from irregularities that affected outcomes
Transparency of proceedings builds acceptance even of a judgment the petitioner loses
South Africa: August v Electoral
Commission (Constitutional Court, 1999)
Held that prisoners could not be denied the vote by administrative omission
The vote is a marker of dignity and citizenship; courts should read electoral law to include rather than exclude
India: N.P. Ponnuswami v Returning
Officer (Supreme Court, 1952) and Article 329(b) of the Constitution
Held that courts may not interrupt an election in progress; challenges must await an election petition
A clear doctrine of noninterference during the electoral process, now echoed in s.88(4) of Nigeria’s
2026 Act
United States: Purcell v Gonzalez; Bush v Gore
Purcell cautions courts against changing election rules close to polling day because of voter confusion. Bush v Gore halted a recount and effectively decided a presidential election, attracting enduring criticism
Late judicial changes to rules harm voters; a court seen to decide the winner pays a lasting legitimacy price
Jurisdiction and case
What the court did
Lesson for Nigeria
United Kingdom: Morgan v Simpson47
An election is void if not conducted substantially in accordance with law, even if the result was unaffected; or if minor breaches did affect the result
A two-limb test that separates the integrity of the process from the effect on the result, more balanced than a pure outcome test
Synthesis. The comparative record suggests three principles. First, a fundamentally flawed process can justify annulment even without arithmetic proof (Kenya, the UK). Second, the preferred remedy is almost always a fresh election, not a judicial declaration of a winner (Kenya, Malawi). Third, courts should avoid changing the rules during the electoral period (India, the US). Nigeria’s jurisprudence has been strongest where it followed these principles and most contested where it departed from them.
9. Conclusion
The answer to Nigeria’s electoral litigation crisis does not lie in the courtroom alone. The comparative evidence suggests that petitions reduce when elections improve, and when disputes are filtered before they reach the courts: by an electoral commission empowered to resolve objections, by parties that conduct credible primaries, and by strict but fair rules on time and costs. Those are matters for INEC, the National Assembly and the political parties.
Nigeria’s experience since 1999 leaves no doubt that the courts are indispensable to its electoral democracy. Where ballots have been stolen, it has often been the tribunals and the appellate courts, not the electoral commission or the political class, that restored the people’s verdict. The question this paper has examined is therefore not whether the judiciary should intervene in the electoral process, but where intervention must stop if the ballot, rather than the bench, is to remain the source of political authority.
10. Going Forward
Popular sovereignty is the interpretive anchor.
The Court, in granting a remedy, must treat the effect on voters as a mandatory consideration at the remedy stage.
The test of a good election judgment is not only whether it applies the law correctly, but whether, at the end of it, the person who holds office is the person the lawful votes chose, or, if that cannot be known, whether the choice has been returned to the voters.
The Courts should prefer a remedy that returns the question to voters, rather than settle it in their stead.
Where a defect in a candidacy or process is proved but the voters’ choice cannot be reliably reconstructed, Courts should prefer a fresh election or re-run over a declaration in favour of a candidate the voters did not choose.
Declare a winner only where the lawful votes clearly show who won. Where the lawful votes clearly show who won, the court should say so. Where they do not, the more faithful order is a fresh election, not a judicial choice. The Supreme Court of Kenya took that course in 2017, and Kenyan democracy was strengthened rather than weakened by it.49
No longer should an election be upheld in favour of a person the electorate did not vote for. The matter must
Morgan v Simpson [1975] QB 151 (CA).
Raila Amolo Odinga v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (n 41).
be returned to the electorate for their own choice. Their choice must not be hijacked by the substitution of non deserving candidates.
It is not the duty of the Courts to award seats.
Where electoral provisions are ambiguous, prefer the reading that gives effect to the free choice of the electorate (s.14(2)(a); ICCPR art. 25; African Charter art. 13).
10.Prefer substance over form, within the rules. Apply procedural rules firmly but proportionately. A defect that causes no injustice should not defeat a petition that deserves an answer; a defect should not be overlooked to reach a preferred result.
11.Integrity, reasons and transparency. Give full, reasoned judgments that the public can follow. Legitimacy is the only power courts have.
11. Final Word
The Constitution places sovereignty in the people and makes the Courts the guardians of that sovereignty, not its holders. Judicial intervention in elections is justified by the right of Nigerians to choose their representatives, and it must be measured by that right. A judgment that corrects a stolen mandate honours it. A judgment that confers a mandate the voters never gave, however lawful in form, diminishes it. The final aim of electoral adjudication should be its own decline: a democracy in which elections are won and lost at the ballot box, not in the courtroom. Thank you for listening.
Being text of the Lecture delivered at the Annual Conference and Awards of Gavel International in Lagos on 17th November,2026







